Searle claims that his theory of institutional reality is particularly suitable as a theoretical scheme of individuation for work in the social sciences. We argue that this is not the case. The first problem with regulatory individuation is due to the familiar fact that institutional judgments have constrained revisability criteria. The second problem with regulatory individuation is due to the fact that institutions amend their declarative judgments based on the inferential (syntactic) properties of the judgments and in response to regulatory (...) pressure, and not based on descriptive (semantic) properties and in response to matters of descriptive adequacy. These two problems imply that ‘regulatory kinds' (countries, borders, kings) will almost inevitably be disjunctive kinds that are ill-suited for scientific theorizing. This also explains why the law often makes odd pronouncements, e.g. calling ketchup a vegetable, considering an arm bent fifteen degrees to be straight, and not admitting that Somaliland is a country. (shrink)

There is a simple, intuitive theory of the semantic reference of proper names that has been unjustly neglected. This is the view that semantic reference is conventionalized speakers reference, i.e. the view that a name semantically refers to an object if, and only if, there exists a convention to use the name to speaker-refer to that object. The theory can be found in works dealing primarily with other issues (e.g. Stine in Philos Stud 33:319–337, 1977; Schiffer in Erkenntnis 13:171–206, 1978; (...) Sainsbury in Erkenntnis 80:195–214, 2015; Sainsbury, Thinking about things, Oxford University Press, 2018), yet these authors provide no sustained discussion of it. Devitt (Designation, Columbia University Press, 1981) did formulate a view on which semantic reference is conventionalized speaker’s reference, yet his views are assimilated to causalist views. This is a mistake. While the conventionalized speaker’s reference view captures much of what is plausible in descriptivism and causalism, it remains distinct from both. (shrink)

Moral conflicts occur in theories that involve more than one principle. I examine basic ways of dealing with moral dilemmas in medical ethics and in ethics generally, and propose a different approach based on a principle I call the "mutuality principle". It is offered as an addition to Tom Beauchamp and James Childress' principlism. The principle calls for the mutual enhancement of basic moral values. After explaining the principle and its strengths, I test it by way of an examination of (...) three responses—in the recent Festschrift for Dr Raanon Gillon—to a case involving parental refusal of a blood transfusion. The strongest response is the one that comes closest to the requirements of the mutuality principle but yet falls short. I argue that the mutuality principle provides an explicit future orientation in principlism and gives it greater moral coherence. (shrink)

In ‘The nature of moral judgments and the extent of the moral domain’, Fraser criticises findings by Kelly et al. that speak against the moral/conventional distinction, arguing that the experiment was confounded. First, we note that the results of that experiment held up when confounds were removed . Second, and more importantly, we argue that attempts to prove the existence of a M/C distinction are systematically confounded. In contrast to Fraser, we refer to data that support our view. We highlight (...) the implications for the moral/conventional theory. (shrink)

Can business humanize its stakeholders? And if so, how does this relate to moral consideration for stakeholders? In this paper we compare two business orientations that are relevant for current business theory and practice: a stakeholder orientation and a profit orientation. We empirically investigate the causal relationships between business orientation, humanization, and moral consideration. We report the results of six experiments, making use of different operationalizations of a stakeholder and profit orientation, different stakeholders, and different participant samples. Our findings support (...) the prediction that individual stakeholders observing a stakeholder-oriented firm see the firm’s other stakeholders as more human than individual stakeholders observing a profit-oriented firm. This humanization, in turn, increases individual stakeholders’ moral consideration for the firm’s other stakeholders. Our findings underscore the importance of humanization for stakeholders’ moral consideration for each other. This paper contributes to a deeper understanding of the firm as a moral community of stakeholders. Specifically, we move away from a focus on managers, and how they can make business more moral. Instead we direct attention to stakeholders, and how business can make these stakeholders more moral. (shrink)

This paper defends traditional political philosophy against the challenges Gaus leverages against it in The Open Society and Its Complexities. Granting Gaus that consensus on the principles of political philosophy is not forthcoming and that complexity undermines many of our most ambitious reform efforts, the paper argues that much work remains for political philosophy as it has been practiced for centuries. This is for three reasons. First, Gaus's own defense of the open society requires resources from the very traditions that (...) he tends to dismiss. Secondly, the kinds of reform Gaus encourages us to focus on in light of complexity presuppose answers to philosophical questions, answers that philosophers have long attempted to provide. Thirdly, not all politically salient philosophical questions are aimed at action guidance. Despite the value in Gaus's analysis, I conclude that political philosophy's future will look, at least in part, like its storied past. (shrink)

This paper is devoted to the study of some subvarieties of the variety Q of Q-Heyting algebras, that is, Heyting algebras with a quantifier. In particular, a deeper investigation is carried out in the variety Q subscript 3 of three-valued Q-Heyting algebras to show that the structure of the lattice of subvarieties of Q is far more complicated that the lattice of subvarieties of Heyting algebras. We determine the simple and subdirectly irreducible algebras in Q subscript 3 and we construct (...) the lattice of subvarieties lambda (Q subscript 3) of the variety Q subscript 3. (shrink)

Foundations of Humanism is a primer on secular humanism written by one of the leading figures in the movement. J.P. van Praag writes that the modern world is shaped by a central paradox: the technology that provides us with unprecedented possibilities at the same time imposes an oppressive organization on society. This organization, with its trappings of overspecialization and overcentralization, promotes feelings of impotence and alienation and a spirit of rebellion, especially in the young. In this book, van Praag examines (...) the ways in which the philosophy of humanism can be applied to this paradox of modern life. Humanism holds that the purpose of life is life itself. Van Praag demonstrates how, through the application of this principle, the paradox can be transcended and how personal fulfillment and social creativity can be achieved. Foundations of Humanism is designed to give the reader a comprehensive view of secular humanism, including its historical roots in classical Greece and the Renaissance, its elaboration as a formal philosophy, and its practical aspects as a social philosophy. Finally, it explores the application of humanist principles in counseling and education. (shrink)

We present in this article a new logical system inspired from linear logic. This system is designed in order to express causality and dynamism. The cut elimination theorem holds for this logic. Examples of applications are given.

So in this outburst of Cornelia should line 104 be punctuated. For the poenas crudelis compare VII. 431 ‘quod semper saeuas debet tibi Parthia poenas’ and Verg. A. 6. 501 quis tam crudelis optauit sumere poenas? whence, or from ib. 585, ‘uidi et crudelis dantem Salmonea poenas’ we may suppose Lucan derived it. The feeble vulgate punctuation which puts the comma after crudelis, supposed to be vocative, well exemplifies the mischievous influence of propinquity.—I now find the correct punctuation in W. (...) E. Weber's Corpus, but with the needless alteration of crudel e s. (shrink)

The solution of the outer multiplicity problem in the tensor product of U(3) irreducible representations (irreps) developed by Biedenharn et al.(1–7) and realized through the well-known Draayer-Akiyama (DA) computer code(8) is extended to the quantum algebra Uq(3). An analytic formula for special stretched Uq(3) Wigner coefficients, $$\left\langle {(\lambda _1 \mu _1 ) H_1 , (\lambda _2 \mu _2 ) \varepsilon _2 \Lambda _2 m_2 \left| { (\lambda _3 \mu _3 ) H_3 } \right.} \right\rangle _{\max }^q $$ is derived using (...) a projection operator method.(9–10) In this expression Hi denotes the highest weight vector of the (λiμi) irrep; the subscript “max” means coefficients corresponding to a unit tensor operator with a maximal characteristic null space; and q is the usual quantum label so the standard U(3) Wigner coefficient, which is required in the DA code, can be obtained in the q→1 limit of the theory. To illustrate the theory, some Uq(3) Wigner coefficients for the tensor product (22)×(22) are calculated. The procedure for evaluating nonhighest weight Wigner Uq(3) coefficients follow the DA prescription. (shrink)